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This article addresses the democratically fundamental question of the inclusive-
ness of electorates and of its impact on citizens’ representation. While the litera-
ture has focussed on the congruence between voters and representatives, it has
neglected congruence issues between citizens and representatives. The article
investigates comparatively this source of newly disenfranchised citizens in a glo-
balised society with increasing mobility. On the one hand, electoral laws vary in
their inclusion or exclusion of emigrants and in the right to vote to non-national
residents (immigrants). On the other hand, naturalisation laws vary in the main-
tenance of nationality for nationals abroad (emigrants) and in their inclusion of
non-national residents. We illustrate levels of ‘discrepancy’ between electorate
and citizenship in 22 OECD countries qualitatively, by presenting differences of
electoral and nationality laws, and quantitatively, by comparing the size of citizen-
ship with that of the electorate, and the national and resident populations. We
show that shifts between political and national communities are primarily due
to naturalisation laws and that electoral laws have so far been unable to
correct for the discrepancy.
1. Introduction
Early studies of forming democratic citizenship have focussed on the progressive
inclusion of increasingly large segments of the population in the electorate: what
classical sociologists and political scientists called ‘incorporation’ or ‘participa-
tion’.1 With the full enfranchisement of the adult population and with the
# The Author [2012]. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Hansard Society; all rights reserved.
For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com
1Rokkan (1999) speaks of incorporation in his model of democratisation based on four thresholds.
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consolidation of national membership boundaries of political systems the analyt-
ical focus shifted toward Rokkan’s third threshold of democratisation, that is,
‘representation’. Since then, citizen–representative congruence has been at the
heart of the empirical study of the quality of democratic representation, that is
the degree to which voters’ preferences are reflected among representatives.2
While early studies focussed on measures of proportionality, in the last years em-
pirical research has addressed the correspondence between ideological prefer-
ences at the electorate level and at the policy-makers’ level (see Deschouwer,
2005; Huber and Powell, 1994; Powell, 2000, 2004; Powell and Vanberg, 2000;
Blais and Bodet, 2006; Golder and Stramski, 2010).
Yet, such work has been conducted under the assumption that electorates by
and large reflect citizens. This assumption could be safely made under circum-
stances of consolidated national boundaries of political systems. The equation
between citizenship and electorate is, however, increasingly problematic in a glo-
balising society with increasing geographical mobility. The definition of citizen-
ship merely through political rights (the right to vote) is restrictive and does not
take into account other elements of citizenship such as social rights (Marshall,
1963) and nationality (Brubaker, 1992). According to a more encompassing
view, the electorate is only a subgroup within the citizenry. The assumption of
correspondence between citizens and voters—which probably has never been en-
tirely realistic—does certainly not apply to periods of elevated international mo-
bility with life-long immigrants and emigrants transcending generations. The
definition of citizenship and electorate under processes of supra-national integra-
tion and globalisation is today subject to ‘restructuring’ of boundaries very
similar to that of other aspects of social and political life.3
Under these conditions, the phrase ‘no taxation without representation’
acquires new scope. An increasing share of citizens living and working ‘abroad’
lose political rights leading to a shift between citizenship and electorate. The
claim this article makes is that issues of inclusiveness are as important as issues
of representation and that therefore they should be revisited. By focussing on
the quality of representation of electorates through representatives, the literature
has forgotten issues of inclusiveness. It is this gap that the article aims to fill.
While some authors have stressed the impact of exclusion on representation,
such as the exclusion of the left-leaning Turkish population in Germany
(Wu¨est, 2004), our article limits itself to discussing the issue of inclusion vs. ex-
clusion of new segments of the globalised society. The article thus proposes to
2Accountability has been understood as the other main dimension of democratic representation (see,
for example, Powell, 2000 and 2004; Mansbridge, 2003).
3For the most systematic treatment of the restructuring of the boundaries of political systems under
pressure of supra-national integration, see Bartolini (2005).
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focus on the under-representation of entire social groups and not on the distri-
bution of voters’ preferences. In other words, the article wishes to shift the focus
from problems of representation to issues of inclusion/exclusion.
The article is organised as follows. First, we elaborate on the notion of citizen-
ship in relation to the electorate. Second, we present a typology of electorates and
the potential causes of variations among types. We show that ideal-typically the
right to vote can be granted to (1) nationals (including emigrants), (2) residents
(including non-nationals) or a combination of both, i.e. (3) resident nationals
only or (4) all residents and nationals. Third, we show qualitative variance in
voting rights for non-national residents and national emigrants across 22 coun-
tries and, quantitatively, the discrepancy between citizenship and electorates in
these countries. The conclusion discusses democratically important implications
of the changing relationship between national and political community, and
makes a practical proposal to overcome the shift between citizenship and political
rights.
2. Citizenship, electorates and representation
The issue of inclusion deals with the relationship between citizenship and elect-
orate. While political rights (the electorate) constitute a crucial dimension of citi-
zenship, the latter concept is broader. Classical definitions of citizenship which we
discuss below include the dimensions of nationality and social rights, as well as
social duties. Accordingly, we define citizenship as the (potential) access to
social rights that are granted to a group of people either through nationality
(which applies to resident nationals and emigrants),4 or through residency (which
applies to national and non-national residents) and, consequently, taxation
duties. In the first case, we speak of a membership principle (the group of
nationals) and in the second case, we speak of a territorial principle (the group
of residents). In both cases citizenship is attached to a number of rights (but
also duties) which an individual can make use of or claim. This entails a defin-
ition of citizenship which does not necessarily correspond to that of the elector-
ate. On the contrary, it is likely that it goes well beyond that of the electorate. For
example, immigrants have access to social provisions and pay taxes, but do not
enjoy political rights. Furthermore, emigrants may profit from welfare provisions
(or can always claim them by returning to the country) without enjoying political
rights.
4Throughout this article, we speak of emigrants strictly speaking, i.e. referring to the first generation
who left the home country (and not to second or further generations). It is therefore distinct from the
concept of ‘expatriates’. This choice is consistent with our definition of citizenship in terms of ‘affected’
principle that should be restricted to the first generation of emigrants.
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Our definition of citizenship is in line with Marshall’s (1963) classical formu-
lation of citizenship including civic, political and social rights.5 Our definition of
citizenship is also consistent with the normative position based on the extent to
which individuals are more or less directly affected by a country’s policies (for
example, Beckman 2006; Song 2009). Nationality has been the most important
institution for the provision of citizenship rights.6 The reception of citizenship
rights is, however, only partly dependent on nationality. In particular,
civic rights are not bounded to nationality as they have developed towards
human rights, which are increasingly granted on a global scale. Above all,
social rights only partly depend on nationality as non-national residents in
most Western countries get similar social provisions as national residents. The
status of non-national residents, who have social but not political rights, has
been described as ‘denizenship’ (Hammar, 1990). The concept of citizenship is
therefore more encompassing than any operationalisation based on political
rights. Political rights that define the electorate include, depending on the coun-
tries, a more or less wide proportion of citizens—as broadly defined above as the
potential recipients of social rights either based on nationality or residency. There
is therefore a varying discrepancy (across countries) between electorate and citi-
zenship with some countries achieving a more or less complete coverage of the
citizenship and some countries excluding a more or less large group.
The distinction between citizenship and voting rights had little impact on in-
clusion and exclusion issues during the peak of the nationalised state. This is
because of the strong coincidence of the territorial boundaries (residency) and
membership boundaries (nationality) during the peak of nationalisation. The
closure of political, cultural, social and to some degree economic boundaries
along the unitary state (Rokkan, 1999; Caramani, 2004) and the following cul-
tural homogenisation (Gellner, 1983) have created a far-reaching congruence of
rights and duties along the lines of the ‘nation-state’. Only recent trends of glo-
balisation and European integration have resulted in a decoupling of boundaries
along different functional and territorial dimensions. The decoupling of territor-
ial from national boundaries has important consequences. The increase in migra-
tion within and between the developed and developing world has had the effect
5The nation-state has been, and largely continues to be, the locus of political and social rights. This
applies to a lesser extent to civic rights, which have an application across national borders
independent of nationality. This is the reason why—as reiterated further down—we focus on the
national level as opposed to the local or supra-national ones.
6It has been granted on two principles: ethnicity and residency (Brubaker, 1992). Which principle is
dominant depends on conceptions of nationhood (see also Koopmans et al., 2005). While civic
conceptions of nationhood foster legal citizenship laws that give nationality dependent on residence
(jus soli), nationality is according to an ethnic conception of nationhood provided dependent on
descent (jus sanguinis) (see also Weil, 2001).
Discrepant Electorates 387
on a growing non-national resident population and on the size of the emigrant
community, as well as on the size of the national community through increasing
naturalisation rates.
The decoupling also affects the composition of electorates. This is because
electoral rights are usually connected to nationality, residency or both. Having
the right to vote does not entirely depend on being a national, as in some coun-
tries it (also) depends on residence: whether or not emigrants should have the
right to vote, and whether or not non-national residents (immigrants) should
be allowed to vote. In the age of globalisation and technological progress, the po-
tential impact of the emigrants’ votes has become considerable with elections
being potentially decided ‘from abroad’. Globalisation increases mobility, which
affects the size of the emigrant community and strengthens the transnational
bonds. Technological innovation has, among others, the effect that voting from
abroad has become much easier. With electronic voting, space ceases being a
decisive factor for the possibility to vote. As will be shown in the next section,
electoral rights for emigrants vary considerably across countries and have a
strong (potential) impact on the size and shape of the electorate.
Electoral laws also vary concerning the resident population. Increasingly,
countries differ in whether they grant voting rights to non-national residents.
Although a trend towards electoral rights for non-national residents can so far
mainly be observed at the local level, a few countries granted the right to vote
in national elections to all residents.7 The effect the expansion of the electoral
right to non-nationals has on the shape and size of the electorate depends on
the size of the foreign community in a given country. The impact of the electoral
rights to non-national residents on the variance in the electorates across countries
depends on the migration flows and on naturalisation laws. All this increases the
discrepancy between electorate and citizenship, as well as the extent to which this
discrepancy varies across countries. According to our definition of citizenship it
leads to newly disenfranchised groups, namely emigrants and immigrants. Exam-
ples of citizens who lost the right to vote ‘back home’ but did not acquire it in the
receiving country are numerous (for example, Turks in Germany), with some
cases of explicit discouragement from both the sending and the receiving
country.8
7We limit our discussion to the right to vote at the national level and exclude provisions for political
rights for non-national residents at the local or regional level. We also exclude political rights in
foreign countries due to supra-national democratic bodies such as the European Parliament. As for
varying registration rules, these apply only to Australia, Canada and the USA. All figures in this
paper are based on the number of registered voters unless specified otherwise.
8We deliberately do not discuss the exclusion of other social groups such as minors, prisoners and
mentally ill persons for which only the USA includes particular provisions. As Uggen and Manza
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Our article is not concerned with whether or not inclusiveness affects the
voter–representative relationship. The quality of representation is in principle in-
dependent from levels of inclusiveness.9 If the preferences of emigrants and
immigrants systematically differ from the national resident ones, whether these
groups keep or receive the right to vote (through naturalisation or the electoral
law) matters for representation issues. However, the claim this article makes is
limited to the fact that the analysis of the quality of representation can no
longer afford to use the shortcut of equating citizenship with the electorate as in-
creasingly large and permanent segments of the citizenship are excluded (rather
than included) from access to political rights. It is this discrepancy between citi-
zenship and electorate—a problem of inclusion rather than representation—with
which this article is concerned.
3. A typology of electorates
3.1. Four types of electorate
In developed democracies, the shape of the electorate can ideal-typically be sum-
marised in four different types depending on whether or not the electoral right is
given to non-national residents and/or expatriates. Similar to Baubo¨ck (2005, p.
685), who distinguishes between four perspectives on ‘expansive electoral rights’,
we distinguish four types of electorate:
† The national–resident electorate includes nationals living in their home
country. It excludes non-national immigrants and nationals who emigrated.
It is the most restrictive type of electorate as, according to this ideal-type,
only nationals living within the borders of ‘their’ state are entitled to vote.
The closest empirical case of this type is Canada.10
† The national electorate includes all nationals independently of whether they are
resident in their ‘homeland’ or not. Voting rights are granted to nationals in the
home countries and to nationals who emigrated abroad. The principle here is
purely based on membership. The closest empirical case of this type is Italy.11
(2002) note, ‘the United States is virtually the only nation to permanently disenfranchise ex-felons as a
class in many jurisdictions, and the only country to limit the rights of individuals convicted of offenses
other than very rare treason or election-related crimes’.
9In theory, one can also achieve perfect representation when no citizen has the right to vote.
10For all these examples, qualifications are in order. In Canada, for example, emigrants have the right
to vote from abroad during the first five years after emigration.
11Italy only recently introduced provisions for voting from abroad linked to registration in a consulate.
Before, emigrants had to travel back to Italy to make use of their right to vote.
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† The resident electorate includes all individuals who are resident in a given
country independently of their nationality. Whether or not they are nationals,
people living in a country have the right to vote. The principle here is purely
territorial. This includes resident nationals and non-national immigrants. The
closest empirical case of this type is New Zealand.12
† The national and resident electorate includes all nationals (whether or not they
live in the home country) as well as all residents (nationals and foreigners).
These are the most inclusive electoral rules extending political rights not
only to emigrants but also to non-national residents. Both membership and
territory principles apply. The closest example of this type is Britain but, strict-
ly speaking, there are no empirical cases.13
These types of electorate are listed from the most restrictive to the most exten-
sive. The two principles that apply are the membership and the territorial one.
Their combination can be depicted as in Figure 1. The two types are pure in
the sense that they are based on either territorial or membership principles,
whereas the two are mixed in the sense that they combine both principles.
Below we will show the degree to which developed democracies fit into these
ideal-types and, consequently, the degree to which they differ. We do not rely
only on the qualitative description of the rules, but also present quantitative
data on the actual shape and size of the electorates. For the moment being, we
concentrate on types and sources of variation between countries.
3.2. Sources of cross-country variation
Electorates across countries vary because of differing provisions in two types of
laws: first, the nationality law and, second, the electoral law. In addition, electo-
rates vary because of differences in immigration and emigration rates.
(1) Nationality laws are relevant for variations in electorates, and in the degree of
discrepancy between citizenship and electorate, as nationality automatically
gives access to political rights. Nationality laws affect membership. First, na-
tionality laws determine the size of emigrant electorate in that it rules on
the maintenance of nationality after leaving the country.14 Second,
12This is due to the very short period of time during which emigrants keep the right to vote from
abroad (three years). The minimum requirement for qualifying to vote for residents is one year for
non-nationals.
13British nationals living abroad can vote for as long as the first 15 years after emigration.
Furthermore, the category of ‘residents’ is very expansive as it includes all resident Commonwealth
nationals (as well as Irish nationals).
14This applies more to further generations than to the first generation of emigrants.
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nationality (here, strictly speaking, naturalisation laws) determines the size of
non-national resident communities (immigrants) in that it rules on the
access to nationality for resident immigrants (again also for further genera-
tions). Nationality laws affect the extent to which more or less large immi-
grant/emigrant groups get (or keep) nationality and consequently political
rights.
(2) Electoral laws are relevant for variation in electorates, and in the degree of
discrepancy between citizenship and electorate, as they grant the right to
vote. Electoral laws affect territoriality. First, electoral laws rule on the right
to vote within the country for non-nationals. It is through the electoral
law that political rights are given to residents who are not nationals (immi-
grants). Second, electoral laws rule on the right to vote outside the country
for nationals. It is through the electoral law that political rights are given
to nationals who are no longer resident (emigrants). Electoral laws affect
the extent to which more or less large immigrant/emigrant groups get (or
keep) political rights (independently of nationality).
(3) The interaction between migration rates and the two types of law is crucial, as
the data in the quantitative part of the article (next section) show. Figure 2
summarises the discussion. What appears to be crucial is the interaction
between rates of immigration/emigration (and therefore the size of non-
national resident groups and nationals abroad) on the one hand, and the
legal framework which makes it possible to access the right to vote, on the
other hand. As mentioned, there are two possibilities for getting the right
to vote: through nationality on the electoral law.
The groups of non-national residents and emigrants can be either small or
large (we simplify for the sake of the argument). We ignore the possibility in
Figure 1 Four types of electorate in modern democracies
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which they are small as this does not affect the level of discrepancy between citi-
zenship and electorate. If there are only very little numbers of immigrants and
emigrants, citizenship and electorate correspond. They also correspond if immi-
grants are given the nationality since citizens acquire automatically the right to
vote. Also when emigrants lose nationality (and therefore claims to social
rights) the two correspond.15 The interesting cases in the perspective of this
article are those in which one finds large numbers of either immigrants or emi-
grants or both. In this case we do not have a citizenship corresponding to the elect-
orate as many nationals may not have the right to vote (because they live abroad)
and many non-nationals living in the country may not have the right to vote. If
there are large numbers of emigrants and/or immigrants, citizenship and elect-
orate do not correspond unless the legal framework corrects for it (either
through the nationality law or the electoral law).16 The last column of the
figure shows how the combination of legal provisions for the right to vote of emi-
grants and immigrants combine to determine the four types of electorate.
Figure 2 Access to political rights for non-national residents (immigrants) and nationals abroad
(emigrants). Combination 1–4: resident electorate (New Zealand); Combination 1–3: national
and resident electorate (Britain); Combination 2–3: national electorate (Italy, Portugal); Com-
bination 2–4: national–resident electorate (Canada); (*) cases in which citizenship and electorate
correspond
15Note that losing the nationality does not only depend on the country of origin but also on the host
country which may require emigrants to give up their nationality of origin.
16The figure simplifies a much more complicated story in which access to political rights for nationals
living abroad is made difficult by registration requirements. This is discussed and illustrated below in
the quantitative part of the analysis.
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4. Discrepant electorates in 22 OECD countries
We divide the empirical analysis in two parts. First, qualitatively, we carry out the
analysis of nationality laws and electoral laws, and how they empirically vary
across countries. Second, quantitatively, we propose an analysis of the
discrepancy between citizenship and electorate based on the size of emigrant
and non-national resident groups.
4.1. Qualitative analysis: naturalisation laws and electoral laws
As we have seen above, it is possible to acquire voting rights either through
nationality laws or through electoral laws. The first includes individuals
in the membership of nationals or excludes them. The second includes
individuals resident in a territory (non-national citizens) and those residents
abroad or excludes them. What appears from the comparative information
collected for 22 OECD countries presented in Table 1 is that countries vary
above all with regard to nationality laws and hardly vary with regard to electoral
laws.
On the one hand, in only very few countries do electoral laws allow non-
national residents (immigrants) to vote in national or federal elections. The only
such case is New Zealand. There are other two cases in which specific types of ‘non-
nationals’ are allowed to vote: first, Brazilians in Portugal under a number of
special conditions; second, British nationals in Ireland and third, Commonwealth
and Irish nationals in the UK. In no other country in the sample considered here
can resident foreigners participate in national or federal elections. On the other
hand, almost all countries allow their national emigrants to maintain the right
to vote. As we see from Table 1 most countries allow their nationals abroad to
keep the right to vote either indeterminately or for a more or less long period of
time. In this regard, the variation is quite large. Out of the 22 countries, 15 allow
expatriates to maintain the right to vote without time limits. There is one
country that does not allow its nationals to vote if living abroad: Ireland.17
Among the remaining six countries, there are three that allow keeping the right
to vote for a short period of time (New Zealand for three years, Canada for five
and Australia for six). Portugal allows emigrants to vote in national elections for
up to ten years after emigration. The impact of this variation on the discrepancy
between citizenship and electorate obviously depends on the size of both immigra-
tion and emigration. We will deal with the interaction between laws and rates of
migrations in the quantitative analysis.
17The exception being diplomats and military. Considering the size of Irish emigration to the USA,
granting emigrants the right to vote would mean that the election could be decided overseas, even
if in this case this applies primarily to second and further generations.
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Contrary to electoral laws, nationality laws vary a great deal across countries in
the extent to which they give access to nationality and, consequently, voting
rights. Nationality laws are the set of rules through which the conditions for
the gain or loss of nationality are set. For clarity we will speak in general of ‘na-
tionality law’ to indicate the extent to which emigrants maintain their nationality
of origin and of ‘naturalisation law’ to indicate the extent to which immigrants
acquire the new nationality. Most countries do not deprive emigrants of their na-
tionality (even after generations, although some do from the third). Nationality
Table 1 Electoral rights at the national level for non-national residents (immigrants) and
nationals abroad (emigrants) in 22 OECD countries

















Australia For the first six years No NA 23.1
Austria Yes No 22 10.5
Belgium Yes No 71 10.3
Canada For the first five years No 67 18.1
Czech Republic Yes No 50 4.2
Denmark Yes No 33 5.8
Finland Yes No 44 2.6
Germany For the first 25 years No 38 12.5






Italy Yes No 33 2.5
Japan Yes No NA NA
Luxembourg Yes No 45 33.2
The Netherlands Yes No 51 10.1
New Zealand For the first three years Yes NA 17.2
Norway Yes No 39 6.8





Spain Yes No 41 5.3
Sweden Yes No 71 11.5
Switzerland Yes No 44 21.9
UK For the first 15 years Partly
c
62 7.9
USA Yes No NA 11.0
Note: NA, information not available.
aIn most countries, emigrants usually need to register as voters (Green, 2007).
bOnly diplomats and military.
cIn the case of Ireland, British residents are also allowed to vote for Da´il elections. In Portugal, Brazilian citizens
with special rights acquire voting rights and in the UK, these rights include Commonwealth and Irish citizens.
dNot more than 15 years in the EU or a Portuguese-speaking country. Additionally, they have to stay at least 30
days in Portugal in the last five years and speak Portuguese (Costa Lobo, 2007, p. 84).
Sources: Data on emigrants’ voting rights from IDEA (2007); electoral rights for immigrants and access to
nationality from MIPEX of the British Council and Migration Policy Group (2007); data on foreign-born
population from OECD (2006).
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laws therefore do not vary a great deal with regard to national emigrants.18 They
do vary, however, a great deal with regard to the naturalisation of non-national
resident citizens. While naturalisation laws based on jus sanguinis are very
closed towards ethnically distinct immigrants—and therefore generate large
numbers of non-national residents—countries based on jus soli tend to be
much more open in the way they naturalise the majority of their immigrant resi-
dents. Good examples of ‘hard-to-get’ naturalisation are Austria and Switzerland.
The third column in Table 1, however, points to other countries for which natur-
alisation for non-national residents is difficult. Using the Migrant Integration
Policy index (MIPEX) that operationalise the easiness with which single nation-
alities can be acquired, we see that besides Austria and Switzerland, also Germany,
Denmark and Finland (as well as Italy and Spain) have naturalisation laws
unfavourable to the incorporation of non-nationals in the electorate through
the nationality law.
The discussion so far leads us to conclude that electoral laws vary little with the
exception of Ireland (as far as the electoral law on emigrants is concerned) and New
Zealand (as far as the electoral law concerning immigrants is concerned). With
regard to the acquisition of nationality and therefore the automatic access to pol-
itical rights, again we find little variation concerning nationality law (emigrants).
However, there is a large variation in naturalisation laws (immigrants). This infor-
mation leads us to formulate the hypothesis that differences in the levels of discrep-
ancy (between citizenship and electorates) are primarily caused by variations in
naturalisation laws, and amplified by a large influx of immigrants.
4.2. Quantitative analysis: size of emigration and immigration
In this section we proceed in three steps. First, we describe citizenship in 21 coun-
tries.19 Then, we describe electorates. Finally, we describe the discrepancy
between citizenship and electorate and interpret variations in the levels of
discrepancy with reference to (1) nationality and electoral laws (mentioned
above) and (2) rates of immigration and emigration.
The data on which we can draw are official register data from National Statis-
tical Offices and from the OECD. Census data contain the number of residents
and the number of non-national residents by age cohorts. The size of the
18Regulations regarding the maintenance of nationality for emigrants are made more complicated by
conditions set by the receiving country and the possibility of having a double nationality. A good
example is the impact on the German naturalisation law on the propensity of Turkish immigrants
to resign from their former nationality before the change of the German naturalisation law in 2002.
19We must unfortunately exclude New Zealand from this part of the analysis because of unreliable
information.
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electorates has been derived from data on electoral results. The data on emigrant
communities had, in several cases, to be estimated. The most valid (and in many
cases only) estimates on the size of the emigrant community have been calculated
by the OECD for the year 2000 (2001 for Italy). They only include the number of
emigrants in other OECD countries and should therefore be interpreted as the
lower bound of the real number. The data further estimate the number of emi-
grants at the age of 15 or older and do therefore slightly overestimate the share
of emigrants at voting age.
Table 2 presents some basic information about citizenship, defined as access to
social rights, for our sample of 21 countries. Let us remember that we consider as
citizens all those who possess the nationality of the country (whether they live in
the country or not) plus those who live in the country (whether they are nationals
or not). It is interesting to see that there is a great deal of variation in the
composition of citizenship in these countries. There are six countries that have
a proportion of non-national residents (immigrants) between 5 and 10% (UK,
Belgium, Germany, USA, Ireland and Sweden). There are two countries with
much higher proportions: Austria and Switzerland (about 18%). And, finally,
there is Luxembourg with 33% of non-national resident citizens (mostly due
to European institutions and financial centres). For the remaining 12 countries,
the proportion of non-national residents is below 5%. Some variation exists also
in the proportion of citizens who live abroad, that is national emigrants. The large
exception here is Ireland with 22.5% of its citizens living overseas. Iceland and
Portugal have a share of emigrants of around 10–13%. Three countries have
rates of nationals living abroad of 5–8% (Finland, Italy, Luxembourg and the
UK). The remaining 14 countries have rates of emigrants of less than 5%.
In Table 3 countries are ranked according to the degree of discrepancy between
citizenship and electorates (last column). The simple indicator we use here is the
percentage of citizens without voting rights, that is, those not included in
the electorate. It is a measure of ‘political exclusion’: the larger the percentage,
the more exclusive the franchise. On top of the table, Luxembourg stands out
with nearly 40% of citizens—i.e. mostly non-national residents (immi-
grants)—excluded from voting rights. Table 4 informs us about the composition
of this excluded segment of the citizenship. Around 85% of the disenfranchised
citizens in Luxembourg are immigrants and only 15% are nationals who
emigrated. Two very similar cases are Austria and Switzerland. For the two
Alpine cases, too, there is a large proportion of citizens who do not have the
right to vote in federal elections (about 22% in both cases). This is one out of
five citizens. As for Luxembourg, disenfranchised citizens are mostly (above
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80% for both Austria and Switzerland) non-national residents.20 Additional
similar cases are Belgium, Germany, Sweden, Norway, Finland and Italy. For
these countries we see a lower level of discrepancy, that is, exclusion. However,
the composition of the excluded citizens is very similar to that of Luxembourg,
Switzerland and Austria, with more than 65% of the excluded citizens being
immigrants.21













Japan 104,353,921 1.1 0.6 98.4 100.0
Czech Republic 8,413,143 1.8 2.7 95.6 100.0
Canada 25,326,533 0.8 4.1 95.1 100.0
Spain 34,355,265 3.8 2.5 93.7 100.0
Australia 14,882,361 4.9 1.8 93.3 100.0
Norway 3,564,658 4.1 3.4 92.4 100.0
Finland 4,335,367 1.8 6.1 92.1 100.0
USA 210,088,689 7.6 0.4 92.0 100.0
Sweden 7,151,617 5.4 2.9 91.7 100.0
Denmark 4,361,200 4.4 4.0 91.6 100.0
The Netherlands 13,071,282 3.9 4.7 91.3 100.0
Italy 50,810,452 2.0 7.2 90.8 100.0
UK 48,720,576 5.6 6.6 87.8 100.0
Belgium 8,477,923 8.6 3.8 87.6 100.0
Germany 69,992,647 8.3 4.2 87.6 100.0
Iceland 223,839 3.3 10.3 86.4 100.0
Portugal 9,531,004 2.6 13.3 84.1 100.0
Switzerland 5,969,867 18.2 4.4 77.4 100.0
Austria 7,548,342 18.0 4.8 77.2 100.0
Ireland 3,516,392 6.0 22.5 71.4 100.0
Luxembourg 363,846 33.3 7.5 59.3 100.0
Notes: Countries are ordered by size of resident nationals. Citizenship is defined as the sum of all nationals (in
country and abroad) and all residents in the country (whether nationals or not). All figures exclude youngsters
below 18 years of age. The interpretation of such figures must allow for bias caused by prisoners and mentally
ill persons who, in some countries, are excluded from voting rights. New Zealand is excluded because of
unreliable information.
Sources: National Statistical Offices; Dumont Lemaıˆtre (2005); OECD (2006). Because in the case of the Czech
Republic and Spain the estimates have been unrealistically low, the share of emigrants is estimated as the
deviation of the electorate from the national residents.
20The same is true for Spain and the Czech Republic. Because in these cases the OECD estimates of the
emigrant community have been unrealistically low, it has been estimated as the deviation of the
electorate from the national residents. In reality, however, the share of emigrants without the right
to vote is still somewhat higher implying that slightly ,100% of the disenfranchised are immigrants.
21Incomplete data sources do not allow us to comment on Australia, Canada and New Zealand.
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Things look different for Portugal and Ireland, as well as for Denmark, the
Netherlands and Japan. Portugal does not have a very high rate of discrep-
ancy (6.6%). It is only slightly higher for Denmark and the Netherlands
(about 8%) while for Japan it is 3.8%. On the contrary, the rate is quite
high for Ireland (14.6%). What these five cases have in common is that
the proportion of citizens without voting rights are to a large extent national
emigrants who lost the right to vote. The proportion of emigrants among the
disenfranchised citizens is around 75% for Ireland, 60% for Portugal, and
around 50% for Denmark and the Netherlands. Another country for which
the proportion is high is Japan: above 70% of the discrepancy (which,
Table 3 Electorates in 21 OECD countries
Country Citizenship Electorate Difference Difference (as %
of total
citizenship)
Luxembourg 363,846 221,103 142,743 39.2
Switzerland 5,969,867 4,628,782 1,341,085 22.5
Austria 7,548,342 5,912,592 1,635,750 21.7
Canada 25,326,533 21,243,473 4,083,060 16.1
Ireland 3,516,392 3,002,173 514,219 14.6
Australia 14,882,361 12,708,837 2,173,524 14.6
Germany 69,992,647 61,432,868 8,559,779 12.2
Belgium 8,477,923 7,570,637 907,286 10.7
UK 48,720,576 44,403,238 4,317,338 8.9
Denmark 4,361,200 3,998,957 362,243 8.3
The Netherlands 13,071,282 12,035,935 1,035,347 7.9
USA 210,088,689 194,327,000 15,761,689 7.5
Portugal 9,531,004 8,902,713 628,291 6.6
Sweden 7,151,617 6,722,163 429,454 6.0
Norway 3,564,658 3,358,856 205,802 5.8
Iceland 223,839 211,289 12,550 5.6
Japan 104,353,921 100,433,798 3,920,123 3.8
Spain 34,355,265 33,045,318 1,309,947 3.8
Italy 50,810,452 49,358,947 1,451,505 2.9
Finland 4,335,367 4,220,951 114,416 2.6
Czech Republic 8,413,143 8,264,484 148,659 1.8
Notes: Countries are ordered by level of discrepancy as a percentage of citizenship. New Zealand is excluded
because of missing information. As far as Australia, Canada and the USA are concerned, figures include only
registered voters. In the USA figures exclude felons and prisoners, 4,686,539 citizens in 2000 (or about 2.3%
of the electorate according to Uggen and Manza, 2002, pp. 778 and 797).
Sources: National Statistical Offices; OECD (2006); Dumont and Lemaıˆtre (2005).
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Luxembourg 142,743 39.2 121,058 84.8 27,164 21,685 15.2
Switzerland 1,341,085 22.5 1,084,645 80.9 262,456 256,440 19.1
Austria 1,635,750 21.7 1,357,388 83.0 366,024 278,362 17.0
Ireland 514,219 14.6 211,742 41.2 792,316 385,000 74.9
Germany 8,559,779 12.2 5,774,762 67.5 2,933,757 2,785,017 32.5
Belgium 907,286 10.7 727,161 80.1 321,544 180,125 19.9
Denmark 362,243 8.3 191,261 52.8 173,009 170,982 47.2
The Netherlands 1,035,347 7.9 515,156 49.8 616,909 520,191 50.2
Portugal 628,291 6.6 244,526 38.9 1,268,726 383,765 61.1
Sweden 429,454 6.0 386,977 90.1 206,604 42,477 9.9
Norway 205,802 5.8 147,125 71.5 122,079 58,677 28.5
Iceland 12,550 5.6 7450 59.4 23,070 5,100 40.6
UK 4,317,338 8.9 2,710,900 62.8 3,229,676 1,606,438 37.2
Japan 3,920,123 3.8 1,121,446 28.6 575,992 2,798,677 71.4
Spain 1,309,947 3.8 1,309,947 100.0 849,298 0 0.0
Italy 1,451,505 2.9 1,003,451 69.1 3,649,377 448,054 30.9
Finland 114,416 2.6 76,425 66.8 265,245 37,991 33.2
Czech Republic 148,659 1.8 148,659 100.0 241,529 0 0.0
Note: This table does not include the USA, Australia and Canada for which the data on the composition of the discrepancy between citizenship and electorate are strongly
influenced by registration rules which make the interpretation of data difficult. Data on the number of registered voters are not available. For the US special regulations with regard










however, is a small one) is due to national emigrants. This is explained by
the very low immigration rates in Japan.22
These figures are summarised graphically in Figure 3. The level ‘zero’ indicates
the number of voters according to official electoral registers. The four bars indi-
cate deviations from the electorate. The white bars correspond to our definition of
citizenship: all nationals (wherever they live) plus all those living in the country
and paying taxes there (whatever their nationality). In some countries, such as
Luxembourg, Switzerland and Austria, there are many more citizens than
voters. The striped bars show that in most cases there are more nationals than
voters and, therefore, that there are always nationals without the right to vote
(those living abroad). The dotted bars indicate that the number of nationals
living in the country is usually only a part of the electorate, although a very
large one obviously. Negative bars indicate here that the group of national resi-
dents is smaller than the electorate. This means that in these countries emigrants
have the right to vote, with the exception of Ireland where the discrepancy
between the share of national residents and the electorate is due to the voting
rights of British nationals. The gray bars, finally, indicate that there are countries
such as Luxembourg, Austria and Switzerland (but also Germany) where the dis-
crepancy between citizens and voters is caused by the exclusion of immigrants
who do not have voting rights through the electoral law and who have a difficult
access to nationality (and through that to voting rights).
In these cases we see very clearly the interaction at play between immigration
flows and nationality (or naturalisation) laws. The largest discrepancies between
citizenship and electorate exist in those cases in which large rates of immigration
are combined with restrictive nationality laws. As seen above, this is the factor that
really varies across countries. Whereas electoral laws hardly ever allow non-
national residents to vote, naturalisation may or may not give access to voting
rights. It is therefore the interaction between high rates of immigration and restrict-
ive naturalisation laws that explain most of the cross-country variation of discrep-
ancy between electorate and citizenship. The same cannot be said to the same
extent for national emigrants. Here rates count, too, but as we have seen the
variation in electoral laws (granting voting rights to emigrants) is small.
5. Conclusion
This article has shown that the quality of democracy in a globalised world
depends to a large extent on the degree to which citizens are included or excluded
22Other countries with a quite large segment of expatriates among the excluded citizens are Iceland,
Italy, Finland and the UK. The proportion of emigrants in the segment of citizenship without voting
rights is above 30% for all these countries.
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in the representation circuit. Based on a broad definition of citizenship we have
shown that in an increasingly mobile society important segments of the citizenry
are losing basic political rights. This has far-reaching consequences for democracy
in institutional settings in which the territorial nation-state still guides formal
democratic rights but increasingly looks out of phase with a transnational
economy and society. The more or less large discrepancy between citizenship
and electorate makes this one-to-one equivalence between citizenship and elect-
orate problematic. The article therefore questions the ‘denominator’, whether
using electorates can replace citizenship. Theoretically, our goal was to shift the
discussion back to more fundamental problems of inclusion/exclusion, to
which globalisation and the increasing geographical mobility of individuals
give new scope.
Empirical results of the article show that the main source of discrepancy
between citizenship and electorate is the combination of high rates of non-
national residents (immigrants) in countries in which naturalisation laws make
it difficult to access nationality and thus voting rights. This large discrepancy is
also not solved by electoral laws since these do usually not grant voting rights
to non-nationals. Problems of inclusiveness are therefore strictly linked to con-
ceptions of nationality—who is a member of the national community and who
is not—and to conceptions of citizenship—who is a member of the political com-
munity and who is not. In principle, it would be possible to imagine changes in
electoral laws granting voting rights to citizens without making them nationals and
Figure 3 Citizenship and electorate in 18 OECD countries
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therefore address also problems of non-permanent migration and residency. This
would make it possible to include citizens in the political community without
including them in the national community. It is an instrument that would
solve normative conflicts about confusing definitions of who is a national and
who is not. It would also solve problems of temporality, since electoral laws
could make voting rights for non-nationals dependent upon non-permanent
residency. Non-national citizens vote as long as they live and pay taxes in a
country, and lose the right as soon as they leave it. This study, thus also points
to normative implications for future research and policy-making.
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